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Evaluation Research and National 
Social Policy: An Academic 
Practitioner's Perspective 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
Society has limited resources and many competing uses for them. I 
therefore take it as being an almost obvious proposition that at any 
point in time policy makers should strive to maximize the social bene-
fits produced by the available funds they have to spend. This proposi-
tion implies that evaluation research should be undertaken either by 
or for government agencies. Policy makers need to know what bene-
fits are being produced by each social program and the resource costs 
involved. They need to know which aspects of which programs are 
working and which programs need to be replaced. 
Any evaluation study of a social program can have four possible 
outcomes, depending on the study's results. First, the study may be 
challenged by those people who are unhappy with, or feel threatened 
by, the study's conclusions. Because virtually any study has some 
methodological deficiencies, and because it is easier to find fault than 
it is to design and conduct an evaluation, this occurs frequently. Sec-
ond, if the evaluation is negative, the program may be killed and the 
funds used elsewhere. Third, the program may be expanded or con-
tracted in scale. Fourth, the program may be modified or redesigned. 
The option chosen depends on policy makers' values and prior bene-
fits; all four outcomes are consistent, for example, with a negative 
conclusion about the program's impact. Although evaluation research 
may itself be value-free, the uses to which the research is put are 
clearly not. 
If the need for evaluation research is so clear, one might question 
why so few evaluations are done in Washington and why evaluation 
research is given low priority. One reason is that the rewards accruing 
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to individuals who undertake evaluations are quite minimal. For ex-
ample, at the highest level of the bureaucracy (e.g., the Assistant 
Secretary level and up), individuals are rewarded for their new initia-
tives, not for evaluating existing programs. The length of tenure of a 
typical high-level administrator is less than two years. To make a 
reputation in such a short time, the executive must do dramatic things 
that call attention to him or her, not simply monitor and evaluate 
existing programs. To increase the amount of evaluation research 
being conducted in Washington clearly requires bureaucrats to have 
longer tenures in their jobs and to be rewarded for their substantive 
long-term efforts—not for their flashy short-run initiatives. 
The second reason evaluation research does not proliferate' in 
Washington is that many individuals with long-term connections to 
particular programs feel threatened by the prospect of having their 
programs evaluated. An evaluation conceivably might adversely af-
fect the level of funding of a program or suggest that the program be 
restructured. Individuals closely connected with a program often con-
clude that an evaluation can only do them harm and seek to avoid, 
like the plague, being subjected to evaluations. 
Indeed, this suggests that evaluation studies should be undertaken 
by outsiders who have no vested interests in either continuing or killing 
a program. It also suggests the wisdom of conducting evaluation stud-
ies under the sponsorship of agencies other than the operating agen-
cy that is running a program. 
There are at least three constraints on the evaluation research pro-
cess that severely restrict the quality and objectivity of evaluations 
done in Washington. First, the agencies funding the evaluations, even 
if somewhat removed from the operation of programs, often hope 
that the evaluations will support their positions on policy issues. For 
example, during the Carter administration I served as a consultant on 
a project evaluating the displacement effects of the public em-
ployment program component of the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CETA) program. The project focused on estimat-
ing the extent to which state and local governments used CETA funds 
to hire employees whom they would have hired even in the absence of 
the funds. 
This evaluation was undertaken by the Urban Institute, a reputable 
private nonprofit research organization in Washington. This project 
was not sponsored by the Employment and Training Administration, 
but rather by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evalua-
tion and Research (ASPER) of the U.S. Department of Labor. Under 
the Ford administration this office tended to summarize the available 
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evidence on the merits and demerits of proposed changes in legisla-
tion or social programs, without taking strong advocacy positions. 
However, during the Carter administration, ASPER was transformed 
into a policy advocate and became the prime supporter for the inclu-
sion of a large-scale public sector employment program in the welfare 
reform legislation then being considered. 
Because of this change in the nature of the office, high-level admin-
istrators in ASPER had a vested interest in seeing that the results 
eventually obtained by the Urban Institute evaluation did not cast 
public employment programs in a negative light. Knowledge of this 
fact placed the ASPER staffers who were monitoring the evaluation in 
a difficult position, as their desire to maintain scientific objectivity 
potentially was tempered by their concern not to undercut their 
"bosses' baby." In the main, in this case they were able to maintain 
their objectivity, although after at least one meeting, those of us in-
volved in the evaluation came away convinced they had been over-
critical of our methodological approach because we found significant 
displacement effects. 
Independent of the merits of the public employment program, 
agencies sponsoring evaluations should not play such an asymmetric 
role. The research methodology should be critically analyzed by the 
sponsoring agency, regardless of whether the results of the study 
support the agency's prior position. More importantly, this example 
also suggests that evaluation components of the cabinet departments 
should be divorced from the policy advocate components. In particu-
lar, there should be an office in the Department of Labor that is free 
to conduct long-run program evaluations without having to get in-
volved in short-run policy advocacy. 
The second constraint on the evaluation process is time itself. Eval-
uations typically have short horizons (one year or less in length) be-
cause policy makers want results in time to utilize them during their 
tenure in office. (Recall that high-level policy makers tend to turn 
over rapidly.) This time constraint prevents many studies from being 
given careful consideration during the design stage, which is neces-
sary if a methodologically sound study is to be conducted. Another 
time constraint relates to the manner in which proposals for evalua-
tions are solicited. The typical request for proposals (RFP) is issued 
with a three-week deadline, preventing academics from bidding on 
the contract (does this sound like sour grapes?) and precluding most 
consulting companies from seriously considering what the optimal 
method of analyzing the problem would be, thereby further limiting 
the likely usefulness of the studies. 
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The third constraint on the evaluation process is that most evalua-
tors are in the evaluation business on a long-run basis and conse-
quently are interested in obtaining future evaluation contracts. They 
are reluctant to submit analyses whose results are in direct conflict 
with what they know policy makers want. It is hard for investigators to 
maintain complete objectivity when they know that reporting certain 
results will increase (or decrease) the probability that they will obtain 
future contracts from the same funding agency. That the potential 
for such a conflict of interests exists was obvious to me in the course of 
my participation in the Urban Institute's CETA evaluation. This 
problem again suggests that it would be wise to separate the evalua-
tion office in a cabinet agency from the office that is in charge of 
advocating policy reform. Evaluation should be done in a neutral 
environment as much as possible, and the evaluator should not be 
forced to respond to the wishes of a policy advocate. 
Independent of how we structure the process by which evaluation 
research is conducted in government, one might ask what the role of 
evaluation research is in public policy decisions. Evaluation research 
seeks to provide information about the benefits and costs of alterna-
tive programs and legislation. It is naive, however, to think that such 
information will dictate a policy decision in any particular situation or 
typically even play a major role in the decision for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, evaluations tend to be narrower in scope than 
what the sponsors of the studies (usually government agencies) really 
want. What is desired is to know whether a particular program is good 
or bad, but what is offered typically is an estimate of one of the 
program's many effects. For example, literally hundreds of econo-
metric studies have focused on estimating the adverse effects of mini-
mum wage legislation on employment. However, only a handful have 
looked at questions such as, Is the legislation complied with? or Do 
minimum wage laws reduce the incidence of poverty?—questions that 
surely must be addressed in any complete evaluation. 
On the other hand, policy makers' decisions are based on a complex 
set of factors that are not restricted to the way the program is operat-
ing, but often hinge on political considerations. Because of this, all 
one can hope is that evaluation research will provide some informa-
tion on the workings of the programs and that this information will 
allow such decision makers, who are at the margin, to make more 
informed decisions. Anyone who conducts evaluation research with 
the anticipation that his or her evaluation study will, and should, auto-
matically be transferred into policy recommendations will perpetually 
be frustrated and should probably find an alternative occupation. 
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Some distinguished academics and policy makers, such as Har-
vard's John Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor, have argued that 
the benefit/cost ratio for evaluation research is zero. The argument 
proceeds along the following lines: Evaluation research uses re-
sources, but it rarely influences decisions, so its benefits must be close 
to zero. As such, the benefit/cost ratio for conducting evaluations is 
close to zero, and it is a waste of resources to undertake the studies. 
This evaluation of evaluation research suggests that society needs less 
of it rather than more. 
I draw the opposite conclusion. Rather than eliminating such stud-
ies, one can increase their benefit/cost ratio by increasing their bene-
fits via utilizing them more in policy decision. It is incumbent upon 
academic economists who accept policy positions in the federal gov-
ernment, as Dunlop did, to increase the extent of rationality in the 
policy decision process by making more use of these studies. 
COMPREHENSION QUESTIONS 
I. According to the article, evaluation research should be undertaken to: 
a. enable program supervisors to hire the right people to implement the 
program 
b. enable program supervisors to be changed without affecting the pro-
gram itself 
c. enable policy makers to conduct cost/benefit analysis 
d. facilitate proper record keeping 
2. Evaluation research is: 
a. value-free, as are the uses to which it is put 
b. not value-free, but the uses to which it is put are value-free 
c. value-free, but the uses to which it is put are not value-free 
d. not value-free, nor are the uses to which it is put 
3. The length of tenure of a typical high-level administrator is less than: 
a. nine months 
b. one year 
c. eighteen months 
d. two years 
4. Evaluation studies should be conducted by: 
a. the director of the program under evaluation 
b. the person who hired the program director 
• c. an outside agency 
d. none of the above 
5. The author discusses which set of problems confronting those conducting 
evaluation research: 
a. time, bias 
b. bias, cost 
c. cost, time 
d. time, cost, and bias 
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6. Sponsors of studies often find evaluations to be: 
a. too broad in scope 
b. too narrow in scope 
c. too expensive 
d. too time-consuming 
7. The author believes that the benefit/cost ratio for evaluation research: 
a. is higher than one would rightfully expect 
b. is zero 
c. should be increased through greater utilization 
d. should be decreased by eliminating waste and duplication 
8. Concerning his own bias, the author: 
a. made no attempt to hide it 
b. unsuccessfully tried to hide it 
c. successfully hid it 
d. eliminated it altogether 
9. The author's structural organization of his subject is best characterized 
as: 
a. chronological and spatial 
b. descriptive enumeration 
c. comparison and contrast 
d. illustration and quotation 
10. The main idea of the article is: 
a. Benefits of evaluation research studies should be maximized through 
greater utilization when planning national social policy. 
b. The federal government spends too much time and money on evalua-
tion research studies, which, all too often, are unneccessary. 
c. Evaluation studies should be conducted by academicians who have no 
vested interest in either maintaining or eliminating the program un-
der evaluation. 
d. Although national social policy has changed greatly under the last 
three presidents, it has not been improved. 
ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 
1. Ehrenberg refers to himself as an academic practitioner. How would his 
topic be approached by a cabinet official? a clerk in a social security office? 
a government economist? 
2. Ehrenberg maintains that evaluation must be done properly, and without 
bias, to be both fair and useful. Apply this view to faculty grading of 
students. To student evaluation of faculty. To evaluation by one's peers on 
a jury. 
3. How can the results of evaluation studies be translated into public policy? 
4. If you headed a delegation to overhaul the social security system, how 
would you proceed? 
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